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Introduction
Abnormal genital discharges, corpses and creeping 
things—confronting these unpleasant realities in the 
Priestly purity regulations of the Hebrew Bible (e.g., 
Leviticus 11–15; Numbers 19) is too much for many 
people, scholars included, to stomach. Nevertheless, 
a brave few have attempted to find some redeeming 
value in this corpus by deciphering the meanings 
concealed within this systematic code. Despite their 
e!orts to uncover a discourse on abstract social or 
theological categories, the gruesome details of these 
stipulations are not particularly hospitable to inter-
pretations that are rooted in an abstract, disembodied 
mode of rationality.
One need not deny, however, that these laws are 
logical. On the contrary, the project of this article is 
to elucidate the pervasive logic of these laws as an 
expression of embodied rationality. By emphasizing 
the grounding of language and thought in bodily 
experience (through reference to modern “embodi-
ment theory”), I will venture to provide a more sat-
isfying account of the biblical concept of “pollution” 
(ṭumʾah) as based on several distinct images or models 
by which this notion was conceptualized in ancient 
Israel.
To a certain extent, this line of inquiry was initi-
ated by Paul Ricoeur’s study The Symbolism of Evil, 
which sought to trace changing conceptions of evil 
in the Western tradition back to their ancient Israelite 
and Greek origins. Starting from the principle “the 
symbol gives rise to thought,” Ricoeur recognized the 
 indispensable role of concrete images in the articula-
tion of religious intuitions.1 Put simply, Ricoeur’s in-
vestigation was based on the realization that religious 
experience is mediated by symbols, and accordingly, 
that an analysis of symbols can reveal a history of earlier 
conceptions. Unfortunately, this important first step 
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Edward Greenstein, Michael Kimmel, and the editors of JNES, es-
pecially Seth Richardson, for helping me improve the arguments in 
this article and their presentation. This study was selected for the 
Society of Biblical Literature’s 2012 David Noel Freedman Award 
and was presented at a panel discussion at the SBL Annual Meeting 
in November 2012. I am grateful to the participants in the panel, 
Elizabeth Bloch-Smith, Jonathan Klawans and Edward Slingerland 
for their insightful comments. The abbreviations used follow the 
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 Alexander et al. (Peabody, MA, 1999). 
1 P. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. E. Buchanan (New 
York, 1967), 347–48.
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in tracing the origins of the biblical notion of pollu-
tion was largely ignored by subsequent research, prob-
ably due to the impenetrability of Ricoeur’s work.2
The present study will explore the relationship be-
tween pollution and the experiences of uncleanness 
and disease. Although the similarity of purity regu-
lations to hygienic practices and fear of infection is 
obvious, it has yet to be adequately explained. In fact, 
due to the recognition that pollution cannot be simply 
reduced to a concern for bodily cleanliness and health, 
this relationship has often been dismissed categori-
cally. In my view, this rejection is overhasty, based on 
faulty methodological premises.
My discussion will be divided into four sections. 
The first section focuses on the theoretical background 
for attempts to interpret pollution, emphasizing the 
distinction between the abstract rationality implicit in 
symbolic interpretations and the notion of embodied 
rationality advocated here. The second section seeks 
to establish the plausibility of the assertion that several 
types of pollution were originally viewed as infection, 
with special attention given to evidence from Mari 
in ancient Mesopotamia. The aim here is to provide 
an appropriate context for analyzing ancient notions 
of disease and their relation to the biblical notion of 
pollution. The third section builds upon the method-
ological and historical considerations of the previous 
sections in order to elucidate biblical texts in which a 
relationship between pollution and infection is sug-
gested, specifically Leviticus 15 (genital discharges), 
Numbers 19 (corpse pollution) and Leviticus 13–14 
(skin disease). The fourth and final section explores 
the logic underlying the conceptualization of pol-
lution, elucidating the psychological mechanism by 
which this unseen force was modeled after phenom-
enal experience.
2 The substance of Ricoeur’s analysis is also problematic, specifi-
cally its attempt to incorporate “defilement” together with “sin” 
and “guilt” into a single linear scheme of changing conceptions 
of evil. Most recent studies endorse a more descriptive approach. 
See e.g., T. Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification and Purgation 
in Biblical Israel,” in The Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth: Essays in 
Honor of David Noel Freedman in Celebration of his Sixtieth Birth-
day, ed. C. L. Meyers and M. O’Connor (Winona Lake, IN, 1983), 
399–414; D. P. Wright, “Clean and Unclean,” ABD VI, 729–41; 
ibid., “The Spectrum of Priestly Impurity,” in Priesthood and Cult 
in Ancient Israel, ed. G. A. Anderson and S. M. Olyan, JSOTSup 
125 (She"eld, 1991), 150–81; S. M. Olyan, Rites and Rank: Hier-
archy in Biblical Representations of Cult (Princeton, 2000), 38–62.
Pollution and Rationality
Pollution as Abstract Rationality: The 
Search for a Unifying Logic
One of the challenges of studying ṭumʾah is the fact 
that this concept is neither wholly concrete nor ab-
stract. Though some scholars have suggested that the 
term may be etymologically derived from the senses 
of “dirt” or “mud,”3 the Bible does not attest these 
usages. Ricoeur notes: “Defilement is not a stain, but 
like a stain; it is a symbolic stain.”4 But since the label 
“symbolic” obscures as much as it reveals, the ques-
tions remain: how did this peculiar metaphysical con-
cept originate, and why was it treated with such utter 
seriousness?
 A further source of ambiguity is the heterogeneous 
usage of ṭumʾah in the Bible, a diversity that is not 
easily organized into a unitary logical scheme. Blur-
ring the domains of hygiene and morality, and encom-
passing disparate situations such as genital emissions 
(normal and abnormal), corpses, bloodshed, sexual 
misconduct and idolatry, this term seems to resist 
systematic analysis. In reality, however, the main ob-
stacle that stands in the way of making sense of this 
category is a lexicographic predisposition towards ab-
stract, disembodied logic, particularly the assumption 
that linguistic categories are defined by necessary and 
su"cient membership criteria.
This latter approach, which guides innumerable 
studies in biblical semantics until this day, can be 
traced back at least to Aristotle. However, as pointed 
out by Ludwig Wittgenstein, the inadequacy of this 
approach becomes apparent when confronted with 
categories such as “games” (e.g., baseball, solitaire, 
ring-around-the-rosie) that cannot be reduced to a 
set of fixed characteristics. In the case of “games,” 
characteristics such as amusement and competition do 
not apply to all cases.5 One may argue that these games 
share some common characteristics (e.g., they have 
3 W. Paschen, Rein und Unrein: Untersuchung zur biblischen 
Wortgeschichte (München, 1970), 27. The main basis of this view is 
the purported cognate ṭamy in Egyptian Arabic with the sense “silt 
of the Nile.” See also G. André,“אמט,” TDOT 5:330–31; HALOT: 
375.
4 Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, 36. This observation may also apply 
to the Old Southern Arabic evidence. See J. Ryckmans, “Les con-
fessions publiques sabéennes: le code sud-arabe de purité rituelle,” 
AION 22 (1972): 5, n. 21.
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. 
G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1963), 31–32 (§66).
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rules), but these are insu"cient, taken by themselves, 
for inclusion in the category.6
Such considerations have led to the emergence 
of alternative theories which emphasize the role of 
family resemblances and prototypes in shaping the 
semantic development of languages.7 These modern 
approaches are more consistent with the recognition 
that languages develop through localized innovations 
(through principles of association such as metonymy 
and analogy) which need not conform to any single 
rigid propositional logic.8 Whereas the classical ap-
proach expects linguistic categories to be homoge-
neous, governed by a pervasive and comprehensive 
order (criteria of inclusion and exclusion), modern 
approaches recognize that many linguistic categories 
are heterogeneous, structured around several distinct 
prototypical examples. In short, one can distinguish 
between a “top-down” model of semantics, whereby 
the lexicon of a given language is governed by rules 
dictated by the rational mind, and a “bottom-up” 
model whereby the linguistic system is the result of 
countless localized instances of semantic develop-
ment. While the former model may serve as the ideal 
for a formal language (an artificial language created 
for the sake of mathematics, computer programming, 
philosophical inquiry, etc.), only the latter model is 
appropriate for a natural language.9
With respect to these considerations, the hetero-
geneous content of the biblical category of pollution 
is hardly exceptional. What is necessary to make sense 
of the di!erent types of ṭumʾah and their character-
istics is a proper appreciation of experiential images 
or models upon which they are based. In employ-
ing the term “image,” I am referring to schematized 
6 See P. Violi, Meaning and Experience, trans. J. Carden (Bloom-
ington, 2001), 152–54.
7 For a more detailed overview, see G. Lako!, Woman, Fire and 
Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chi-
cago, 1987), 5–154, with special attention given to the pioneering 
work of Eleanor Rosch.
8 See e.g., A. Blank, Prinzipien des lexikalischen Bedeutungswan-
dels am Beispiel der romanischen Sprachen (Tübingen, 1997); E. C. 
Traugott and R. B. Dasher, Regularity in Semantic Change (New 
York, 2001).
9 Generally, the aim of creating formal languages is to elimi-
nate ambiguity by attributing a univalent definition to each term. A 
notable example would be the attempt to establish an ideal philo-
sophical language, pursued by Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein in 
the early twentieth century, though ultimately Wittgenstein aban-
doned this line of inquiry to delve into the complexities of natural 
language.
understandings of recurrent bodily experiences (not 
necessarily visual), which can be simple or complex.10 
Not only will this approach provide a more accurate 
understanding of the lexical data, it will o!er a key to 
the exegesis of the purity laws.
So far I have discussed the rationality of semantic 
categories as it pertains to the concept of ṭumʾah. A 
similar tendency to assume a coherent rational struc-
ture also finds expression in the analysis of pollution-
related practices. Whether based in the symbolist 
tradition of Émile Durkheim or the structuralist tra-
dition of Claude Lévi-Strauss, these analyses tend to 
assume an underlying logical scheme, whereby the 
practices represent either social or cognitive categories.
Though attempts to understand this concept al-
legorically can be traced back to late antiquity, the 
modern tendency to interpret purity regulations as a 
symbolic system is largely indebted to the influential 
work of Mary Douglas. Starting from the premise that 
dirt is “matter out of place,” she shows the poten-
tial for using impurity customs and beliefs as keys to 
 deciphering the symbolic system of the culture:
Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. 
Where there is dirt, there is system. Dirt is the 
by-product of a systematic ordering and classi-
fication of matter, in so far as ordering involves 
rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea of 
dirt takes us straight into the field of symbol-
ism and promises a link-up with more obviously 
symbolic systems of purity.11
According to this framework, before one can account 
for why a given act is defiling, one must first iden-
tify the classificatory system that is being violated. In 
this manner, Douglas argued that the designation of 
unclean animals in Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 
14 stems from their anomalous characteristics (e.g., 
aquatic creatures lacking fins and scales). These devia-
tions caused them to be perceived as threatening the 
10 This usage is largely compatible with M. Kimmel’s character-
ization of “image schemas.” It is important to keep in mind that 
the pollution schema is primarily a pattern of active response, not 
a mental representation. See M. Kimmel, “Culture Regained: Situ-
ated and Compound Image Schemas,” in From Perception to Mean-
ing: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics, ed. B. Hampe (Berlin, 
2005), 285–312; and “Properties of Cultural Embodiment: Les-
sons from the Anthropology of the Body,” in Body, Language and 
Mind. Volume 2: Sociocultural Situatedness, ed. R. M. Frank et al. 
(Berlin, 2008), 77–108.
11 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts 
of Pollution and Taboo (London, 1992 [1966]), 35.
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biblical notion of holiness, equated with wholeness—
of the individual and the category.
This approach has been refined and adapted in 
subsequent studies, including those of Douglas her-
self, and its working assumption continues to inspire 
 research. In particular, biblical scholars have enthusi-
astically developed the premise that the body can serve 
as a medium of expression onto which social ideals and 
patterns are projected. For example, Howard Eilberg-
Schwartz writes: “The fluids of the body turn out 
to be a kind of language in which various religious 
themes find their voice.”12 Even more forcefully, Jon 
Berquist views the laws of bodily fluids as implying an 
aspiration for bodily wholeness, itself a microcosm for 
the ideal Israelite society:
The whole body, for Israel, was not only a con-
struction of how culture expected the physical 
body to operate and perform; the body was 
also a representation of how the society should 
 organize itself and function, in the smallest units 
(the family or household) as well as the largest 
(the tribe, the nation, the colony, or any other 
form of the “body politic”).13
With all due respect for the ingenuity required for 
such homologies, these studies raise several di"culties. 
For instance, assuming that these symbolic interpre-
tations were external to the conscious motives of the 
ancient Israelites observing various ritual practices, 
these studies fail to explain by what mechanism these 
symbolic schemes (unconsciously) emerged. Further-
more, these interpretations assume a questionable 
mind-body dualism in which the body serves as a 
vehicle of expression which can e!ectively be disre-
12 H. Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology 
of Israelite Religion and Ancient Judaism (Bloomington, 1990), 
179.
13 J. L. Berquist, Controlling Corporeality: The Body and the 
Household in Ancient Israel (Piscataway, 2002), 45. This view takes 
its inspiration from Douglas’ assertion: “The threatened boundar-
ies of [the Israelites’] body politic would be well mirrored in their 
care for the integrity, unity, and purity of the physical body” (Purity 
and Danger, 124). However, it should be noted that Douglas later 
retracted this statement in light of the fact that Leviticus and Num-
bers do not employ these rules to separate Israelites from foreign 
races (In the Wilderness: The Doctrine of Defilement in the Book of 
Numbers [She"eld, 1993], 20). More recently, she has argued for 
a homology between the body and the hierarchy of sacred space in 
the Tabernacle (Leviticus as Literature [Oxford, 1999], 190–91), 
a view already proposed in R. Whitekettle, “Leviticus 15.8 Recon-
sidered: Chiasm, Spatial Structure and the Body,” JSOT 49 (1991): 
31–45.
garded once the encoded message is comprehended.14 
While authors disagree as to how to interpret the hid-
den logic of the “purity system,”15 they rarely address 
the possibility that the project itself is fundamentally 
ill-conceived.16
For example, a common view which finds expression 
among traditional and modern exegetes alike is that 
impurity symbolizes death.17 Proponents of this the-
ory point to the explicit connections between the skin 
disease ṣaraʿat (conventionally translated  “leprosy”) 
and references to death (Numbers 12:12) and mourn-
ing (Leviticus 13:45–46). These scholars also construe 
menstrual impurity (Leviticus 15:19–24) as stemming 
from the loss of life-fluid and for constituting a period 
of infertility. Unfortunately, this view is ill-equipped to 
explain why sexual relations  defile (Leviticus 15:18),18 
notwithstanding the counter-intuitive claim that the 
loss of seed (even in coitus) is a kind of death.19 These 
theories su!er from the endemic weakness of Aris-
totle’s theory of categorization: any exceptional case 
undermines the assumption that category membership 
is defined by fixed criteria.
An alternative approach has been to explain the 
impure discharges as a result of their uncontrollable 
nature. For example, to explain the biblical distinc-
tion between the minor impurity of semen from other 
14 See M. Jackson, Paths toward a Clearing: Radical Empiricism 
and Ethnographic Inquiry (Bloomingfield, 1989), 122–23.
15 For an insightful survey, see C. Nihan, From Priestly Torah to 
Pentateuch, FAT2/25 (Tübingen, 2007), 301–39.
16 See, however, Walter Houston’s extensive critique of Douglas’ 
view as it bears on the dietary laws (Purity and Monotheism: Clean 
and Unclean Animals in Biblical Law, JSOTSup 140 [She"eld, 
1993], 93–123), and more comprehensively T. M. Lemos, “Where 
There Is Dirt, Is There System?: Revisiting Biblical Purity Con-
structions,” JSOT 37 (2013): 265–94.
17 This interpretation has been advanced forcefully by J. Mil-
grom, Leviticus 1–16 (New York, 1991), 766–68; 1000–1003. See 
also Olyan, Rites and Rank, 143–44, n. 15; Nihan, From Priestly 
Torah, 304, n. 158.
18 Nor can this “anomaly” be swept under the rug, since it ap-
pears consistently cross-culturally. See, e.g., R. Parker, Miasma: Pol-
lution and Purification in Early Greek Religion (Oxford, 1983), 74; 
K. van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia: A 
Comparative Study (Assen, 1985), 22.
19 See, e.g., G. J. Wenham, “Why Does Sexual Intercourse Defile 
(Lev 15 18)?” ZAW 95 (1983): 432–34; E. L. Greenstein, “Bibli-
cal Law,” in Back to the Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish Texts, ed. 
B. W. Holz (New York, 1984), 95, who coins the expression “life-
leaks.” However, as H. Maccoby points out, these approaches are un-
dermined by the fact that the life-threatening loss of blood from an 
open wound is not defiling (Ritual and Morality: The Ritual Purity 
System and its Place in Ancient Judaism [Cambridge, 1999], 49).
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genital discharges, H. Eilberg-Schwartz argues: “Since 
semen is ejaculated from the body through orgasm, its 
loss is symbolically associated with direct action and 
conscious thought. Nonseminal discharge and men-
strual blood, on the other hand, are passively released 
from the body.”20 But this theory is hard-pressed to 
explain why the impurity of a deliberate sexual act 
is the same as that of an accidental seminal emission 
(Leviticus 15:16).21 Upon reading these attempts, one 
is struck by the intense e!orts expended to derive the 
concrete rules pertaining to bodily conditions from 
abstract categories. When the originally-proposed 
 dichotomies (life/death, control/lack of control) fail 
to fit the data, further distinctions are added—male 
versus female, upper versus lower orifices, etc.—with 
the aim of preserving the abstract category distinc-
tions.22 If adding more detailed parameters based in 
embodied experience contributes to a better under-
standing of the data, perhaps we should consider the 
possibility that the logic is embodied through and 
through and unrelated to abstract schemes. Or per-
haps this can be formulated as a question: should a 
correct interpretation be based on an abstract expla-
nation which sees beyond the textual details which 
focus on bodily experience, or should the explanation 
emerge from an engagement with the “grisly details” 
of bodily experience?
Pollution as Embodied Rationality
I have hinted above at the possibility that the seman-
tics of the term ṭumʾah and the practices associated 
with this concept may be better explained as an expres-
sion of a “bottom-up” (situated and embodied) mode 
of rationality. In seeking a theoretical framework for 
this alternative account, we can benefit from the in-
tense collaboration in recent decades of cognitive sci-
entists, philosophers, anthropologists and semioticians 
in the development of theories of embodied cognition. 
20 Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism, 186–89, esp. 187.
21 M. Malul, who substitutes his notion of “epistemic control,” 
is still unable to o!er a satisfactory explanation (Knowledge, Control 
and Sex. Studies in Biblical Thought, Culture and Worldview [Tel-
Aviv, 2002], 387–90).
22 Ibid., 386–94. These e!orts are reminiscent of attempts to 
create a disembodied Artificial Intelligence by means of abstract 
rules and propositions, despite the fact that human intelligence is 
situated and embodied. See H. L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still 
Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (Cambridge, MA, 1992); 
A. Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together 
Again (Cambridge, MA, 1997).
Though this field of research is hardly monolithic, 
many of its advocates share a concern with the role of 
the phenomenological experience of living in a body 
on the processes of reasoning. In referring to em-
bodiment in the present context, I wish to demon-
strate that the ancient Israelite conception of pollution 
was grounded in concrete experience and should be 
analyzed from a phenomenological perspective that 
is philosophically non-dualistic, socio-culturally situ-
ated and appeals to the emotion-laden subjectivity of 
individual actors.23
Let us begin with an anthropological account of 
pollution which encapsulates many of the emphases 
of embodiment theory. In an important critique of 
Douglas’ theory based on field work in Papua New 
Guinea, A. S. Meigs points out that not every disor-
dered phenomenon is considered defiling. Whereas 
a toy boat on the kitchen table may be “messy,” it is 
not considered defiling like shoes on the kitchen table. 
The reason for this discrepancy, Meigs suggests, is 
that shoes are potential carriers of substances such as 
feces, urine and saliva from the street. More generally, 
she relates notions of defilement to a visceral sense of 
disgust for decay and waste matter, particularly when 
these threaten to access another person’s body, such as 
through eating or sexual relations.24 For our purposes, 
the important point is the di!erence between Meigs’s 
emotional/intuitive account of defilement and that of 
Douglas and others who relate the notion to category 
violations or ambivalent states. Unlike the abstract 
 explanations of pollution which invoke goals foreign 
to the motives of the actors, Meigs’s account is con-
sistent with their conscious concerns.25
As the work of Meigs suggests, one need not travel 
to Papua New Guinea in order to study pollution, 
as this notion finds parallels much closer to home. 
In a large-scale research program spanning decades, 
Carol Nemero! and Paul Rozin have examined the 
notion of contagion, particularly as experienced by 
academically-educated Americans. In a general formu-
lation, they describe contagion as the assumption that 
“physical contact between the source and the target 
23 For a comprehensive meta-theoretical framework encom-
passing the various approaches, see T. Rohrer’s helpful list of “di-
mensions of embodiment” in “The Body in Space: Dimensions of 
Embodiment,” in Body, Language and Mind. Volume 1: Embodi-
ment, ed. T. Ziemke et al. (Berlin, 2007), 348–59.
24 A. S. Meigs, “A Papuan Perspective on Pollution,” Man 13 
(1978): 304–18.
25 See ibid, 317, n. 9.
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results in the transfer of some e!ect or quality (es-
sence) from the source to the target.”26 In some cases, 
the assumption of a transfer of essence is corroborated 
by science (e.g., in germ-theory), but frequently it 
is based on an emotional bias that overwhelms cold 
reason. As a simple illustration, a person who picks 
up a piece of feces or cockroach by means of a plastic 
bag is usually inclined to wash his hands afterwards, 
despite the absence of actual contact.
The modes of transfer involved in schemas of 
contagion are modeled after those perceived in phe-
nomenological experience. Among the numerous 
experiments carried out by Nemero! and Rozin, a 
particularly relevant study was their inquiry into men-
tal models associated with contagion, first published 
in 1994.27 This study was based on interviews and 
questionnaires given to adult Americans who were 
asked about their reaction to wearing a sweater after 
it had been in contact with various types of negative 
influence. Participants were also questioned whether 
they felt certain “purificatory” procedures could undo 
the negative e!ects of contagion. In analyzing these 
responses, Nemero! and Rozin detected a clear dis-
tinction between physical and nonphysical models of 
contagion.
The physical model of contagion included sources 
such as feces and disease, most of which could be “pu-
rified” by means of acts such as washing and boiling 
the sweater. The nonphysical model, by contrast, ap-
plied to moral and social sources, i.e., a sweater worn 
by an enemy or mass-murderer, which could be best 
“purified” by exposure to an opposing valence (i.e., 
being worn by a person with positive social or moral 
attributes). Granted, responses would often blur the 
distinction between physical and nonphysical sources 
of contagion. Nevertheless, the results of this study 
clearly support the conclusion that contagion sche-
mas operate according to ontological assumptions re-
garding the nature of the essence transmitted within 
26 C. Nemero! and P. Rozin, “The Makings of the Magical 
Mind: The Nature and Function of Sympathetic Magical Thinking,” 
in Imagining the Impossible: Magical, Scientific and Religious Think-
ing in Children, ed. K. S. Rosengren et al. (Cambridge, 2000), 3.
27 C. Nemero! and P. Rozin, “The Contagion Concept in Adult 
Thinking in the United States: Transmission of Germs and Inter-
personal Influence,” Ethos 22 (1994): 158–86, and “Sympathetic 
Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity ‘Heuristics,’” 
in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. 
T. Gilovich et al. (Cambridge, 2002), 211–13. The following sum-
mary is necessarily much abbreviated; the reader should consult the 
original publication for further details.
the framework of accepted cultural beliefs, though, 
when questioned, respondents would admit (with em-
barrassment) that their responses were not entirely 
 consistent with purely scientific reasoning.
Defilement and Disease: Regaining 
a Historical Perspective
Since the emotional responses to contagion are 
 dependent on culturally legitimated attitudes, it is 
worthwhile to examine the relationship between pol-
lution and ancient perceptions of disease. Despite 
the common recognition of the similarity between 
practices motivated by hygiene and those pertain-
ing to ‘ritual purity,’ the relationship between these 
two categories of behavior has yet to receive an ad-
equate explanation. In the late nineteenth century, 
E. B. Taylor characterized ritual purification as rep-
resenting “the transition from practical to symbolic 
cleansing, from removal of bodily impurity to deliver-
ance from invisible, spiritual, and at last moral evil.”28 
However, the historical data do not corroborate this 
neat linear account. A di!erent type of evolutionary 
explanation is suggested by evolutionary psychologists 
who point out that this disgust response is remark-
ably well-adapted for distancing humans from disease, 
parasites and other sources of danger.29 However, in 
their emphasis on biological selection pressures, these 
accounts do not adequately address the actual motives 
governing the conscious behavior of actors.30
28 E. B. Taylor, Religion in Primitive Culture (New York, 1958 
[1873]), 515.
29 See e.g., C. D. Navarrete and D. M. T. Fessler, “Disease Avoid-
ance and Ethnocentrism: The E!ects of Disease Vulnerability and 
Disgust Sensitivity on Intergroup Attitudes,” Evolution and Human 
Behavior 30 (2006): 270–82; M. Oaten, R. J. Stevenson, and T. I. 
Case, “Disgust as a Disease-Avoidance Mechanism,” Psychological 
Bulletin 135 (2009): 303–21; P. Prokop and J. Fančovičova, “The 
Association Between Disgust, Danger, and Fear of Macroparasites 
and Human Behaviour,” Acta Ethologica 13 (2010): 57–62. For an 
application of an evolutionary perspective to the biblical notion of 
pollution, see T. Kazen’s “Dirt and Disgust: Body and Morality in 
Biblical Purity Laws,” in Perspectives on Purity and Purification in 
the Bible, ed. B. S. Schwartz et al. (New York, 2008), 43–64, and 
“Impurity, Ritual, and Emotion: A Psycho-Biological Approach,” 
in Issues of Impurity in Early Judaism (Winona Lake, IN, 2010), 
13–40. These approaches provide a coherent and convincing alter-
native to the groping attempt of W. I. Miller to characterize disgust 
in The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 38–108.
30 As Houston remarks regarding cultural materialism, one must 
still explain “the mechanism by which an ecological need becomes a 
religious prescription” (Purity and Monotheism, 92).
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More commonly, a direct relationship between hy-
giene and purity is dismissed out of hand by modern 
scholars. Though this point is usually discussed in re-
lation to the dietary laws (Leviticus 11), the points 
raised are illuminating examples of how logical non-
sequiturs can close o! potentially fruitful lines of 
inquiry. When the biblical rules are consistent with 
medical knowledge, e.g., the relationship between 
trichinosis and uncooked pork, the question raised 
is how the Israelites could have known. When sci-
entific data contradict the rules, that is taken as even 
stronger grounds for rejecting a hygienic rationale.31 
Most forcefully, the medieval rabbinic commentator 
Abravanel points out that there is no evidence that 
Jews were healthier than gentiles, thus dismissing the 
assumption of health as a basis for the dietary laws.32
Since the anachronism implicit in these arguments 
is seldom recognized, it is necessary to begin our dis-
cussion with a historical survey of models of infection 
in order to establish a more fitting interpretive context 
by which to understand the biblical evidence.33 Pre-
modern conceptions of infectious diseases are invari-
ably structured by metaphors.34 Nutton writes: “It 
is important first to remember that in all this we are 
dealing with descriptions of the invisible, with hypo-
thetical reconstructions of how things are or act, based 
only on the observance of ‘macrophenomena.’”35 Al-
though Galen’s references to “seeds of disease” in the 
second century C.E. may have prefigured germ theory 
to some degree, this potential was left virtually un-
explored for the next 1,600 years. In the meantime, 
Western medicine was dominated by the metaphor 
of a stain (Greek miasma, Latin infectio), that could 
spread corrupting influence either by means of direct 
contact or through the bad air emitted by putrefac-
31 Ibid., 69–70.
32 Commentary on Lev. 11.
33 I thank Markham Geller for suggesting that I explore the his-
tory of Western notions of infection.
34 These expressions frequently persist as “dead metaphors” 
in our modern lexicon. Referring to expressions such as “cold-
blooded,” “melancholy,” and “hysterical,” D. Wootton remarks, 
“Our language is littered with the flotsam and jetsam of a vast 
historical catastrophe, the collapse of ancient medicine, which has 
left us with half-understood turns of phrase that we continue to 
use because metaphorical habits have an extraordinary capacity for 
endurance” (Bad Medicine: Doctors Doing Harm Since Hippocrates 
[Oxford, 2006], 12).
35 V. Nutton, “The Seeds of Disease: An Explanation of Con-
tagion and Infection from the Greeks to the Renaissance,” Medical 
History 27 (1983): 2.
tion (Greek sepsis).36 These two models for infection 
persisted as late as the mid-nineteenth century C.E., 
represented by the rival schools of contagionism (via 
direct contact) and miasmatism (via bad air) which 
attempted to account for the spread of cholera in Lon-
don.37 In fact, these models—based on an assumed 
correlation between perceptible means of transmis-
sion and the spread of infection—severely impeded 
the emergence of alternative accounts, including the 
correct one, that cholera was transmitted by imper-
ceptible water-borne germs.38
The important point that emerges from this brief 
historical survey is that we must be careful not to 
impose anachronistic category distinctions on the 
evidence, such as that between “religious pollution” 
and infectious disease. For example, upon noting that 
Greek notions of pollution could be dependent on the 
social status of a person, Eireann Marshall comments: 
“[W]hile ancient Greeks did not necessarily perceive 
diseases as infectious, they thought that religious pol-
lution could be spread to other people.”39 In a similar 
vein, the social historian Virginia Smith writes:
Religious purity has a distinct role in the history 
of personal hygiene. It was not functional, not 
rational, and more often than not completely il-
lusory; but it was a key cultural component that 
determined the lives and cleansing behaviour of 
very large numbers of people.40
These authors would have been wiser to downplay 
such modern distinctions, as does Robert Parker in 
his more fitting characterization:
It is not clear that diseases ever truly became 
infectious in any other sense than this in Greek 
thought. Greeks were practically aware, in time 
of plague, that the disease could be contracted 
36 O. Temkin, “An Historical Analysis of the Concept of Infec-
tion,” The Double Face of Janus and Other Essays in the History of 
Medicine (Baltimore, 1977 [1953]), 157, 161.
37 See H. ten Have, “Knowledge and Practice in European Med-
icine: The Case of Infectious Diseases,” in The Growth of Medical 
Knowledge, ed. H. ten Have et al. (Netherlands, 1990), 15–40.
38 This case of scientific stagnation is all the more disturbing 
in light of the fact that the existence of micro-organisms had been 
observed by microscopes already in the late seventeenth century; 
see Wootten, Bad Medicine, 195–210.
39 “Death and Disease in Cyrene,” in Death and Disease in the 
Ancient City, ed. V. M. Hope and E. Marshall (London, 2000), 22 
(emphasis added).
40 V. Smith, Clean: A History of Personal Hygiene and Purity 
(Oxford, 2007), 29–30.
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by contact, but in popular perception this may 
have been no more than an acute instance of the 
contagiousness of misfortune.41
For an accurate emic understanding of the ancient 
sources, it is not su"cient merely to recognize that the 
conflation of the categories “infection” and “defile-
ment” is an inevitable consequence of the non-exis-
tence of a developed scientific approach for studying 
infectious disease. A full appreciation must acknowl-
edge the existence of metaphysical schemes which 
assume dynamics such as the contagiousness of mis-
fortune to be ontologically real. In rejecting the view 
that contagion beliefs are bizarre and counterintuitive, 
Nemero! and Rozin make a similar point in stating:
It seems more plausible to us that the general 
set of invisible, insensible forces that can cause 
illness, death, disaster, and social e!ects might 
constitute a cognitive domain with its own rele-
vant set of rules and principles—such as conta-
gion, which deals with situations where things 
are not as they seem, where there is more to the 
eye than the obvious, and where imperceptible, 
transmissible forces exert their influences.42
In other words, contagion attitudes involve meta-
physical assumptions, culture-specific understandings 
of invisible causal forces.
As has been elucidated in several recent studies,43 
the epistolary evidence from Mari of the early eigh-
teenth century B.C. provides us with the earliest writ-
ten documentation of how the spread of infection 
was perceived. These letters describe the epidemic(s) 
which took place during the reigns of Zimri-Lim and 
Iasmaḫ-Adad as a form of divine intervention. In these 
texts, a plague was referred to as a “devouring by the 
god” (ukulti ilim) or as the god’s “placing the hand” 
(qātum šaknat) or “touching” (ilappat/ulappat) the 
a!ected region. These letters also describe the re-
41 See Parker, Miasma, 219–20.
42 “The Makings of the Magical Mind,” 25.
43 J.-M. Durand, “Trois études de Mari,” MARI 3 (1984): 
143–49 (§I/9. Maladies); E. Neufeld, “The Earliest Document of 
a Case of Contagious Disease in Mesopotamia (Mari Tablet ARM 
X, 129),” JANES 18 (1986): 53–66; W. Farber, “How to Marry 
a Disease: Epidemics, Contagion, and a Magic Ritual against the 
‘Hand of a Ghost’,” in Magic and Rationality in Ancient Near East-
ern and Greco-Roman Medicine, ed. H. F. J. Horstmansho! and M. 
Stol (Leiden, 2004), 119–22. On contagious disease in general, see 
J. Scurlock and B. Andersen, Diagnoses in Assyrian and Babylonian 
Medicine (Chicago, 2005), 17–20.
sponse to these plagues, which range from containing 
individual cases through quarantine to mass exodus 
from a!ected (laptum, literally “touched”) cities.
Though the epidemics were attributed to divine 
anger, the descriptions of quarantine procedures re-
semble a fairly modern reaction to infectious disease. 
In a letter from the queen Šibtum to Zimri-Lim, it 
is related that her servant was placed in an isolated 
dwelling where she would eat her meals separately 
from the rest of the palace servants: “[No o]ne will 
approach her bed or chair.”44 In a letter from Zimri-
Lim to Šibtum, the king expresses concern regarding 
another infected servant who has been freely interact-
ing with the personnel: “Now command that no one 
will drink from a cup that she drinks from, nor sit in 
a chair in which she sits, nor sleep on a bed in which 
she sleeps!”45
Scholars have noted that these sources find a strik-
ing parallel in Tablet III of the Mesopotamian Šurpu 
incantation which deals with the dangers of mak-
ing contact with an “accursed” (tamû) person (lines 
130–33):46
the māmītu of talking to an accursed man,
the māmītu of eating an accursed man’s food,
the māmītu of drinking an accursed man’s water,
the māmītu of drinking an accursed man’s 
left-overs.
Though the term māmītu originally signified an 
“oath-curse,” it is depicted here as a curse that can 
be transferred through contact with the cursed per-
son.47 As can be seen from the comparison with the 
Mari  letters, the contagiousness of a curse was indis-
tinguishable from that of a sickness. It is worth add-
44 ARM 10, 14; Durand, “Trois études de Mari,” 144; Farber, 
“How to Marry a Disease,” 122.
45 ARM 10, 129; Durand, “Trois études de Mari,” 144; Farber, 
“How to Marry a Disease,” 122.
46 Text and translation: E. Reiner, Šurpu. A Collection of Su-
merian and Akkadian Incantations, AoF Beiheft 11 (Osnabrück, 
1970), 22–23 (with adaptations). For a synopsis of alternative 
readings, see R. Borger, “Šurpu II, III, IV, und VIII in ‘Partitur’,” 
in Wisdom Gods and Literature: Studies in Assyriology in Honor of 
W. G. Lambert, ed. A. R. George and I. L. Finkel (Winona Lake, 
IN, 2000), 48–49. The resemblance of this text to a notion of infec-
tion was observed already by H. E. Sigrist, A History of Medicine, 
vol. 1 (New York, 1951), 446. See also M. J. Geller, “The Šurpu 
Incantations and Lev. V. 1–5,” JSS 25 (1980): 188; Farber, ”How 
to Marry a Disease,” 126.
47 See Y. Feder, “The Mechanics of Retribution in Hittite, Mes-
opotamian and Biblical Texts,” JANER 10 (2010): 127–35.
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ing that elsewhere we find numerous texts portraying 
māmītu as an illness that must be treated by ritualistic 
medical means.48
These sources are highly relevant for understanding 
biblical notions of disease and defilement. First of all, 
like the usage of the Akkadian verb lapātu, the Bible 
employs the verbal root n-g-ʿ (whose basic sense is 
“to touch”) to describe disease. The derivatives of this 
verb include the piel verbal form used to describe God 
a&icting people and lands with disease (e.g., Genesis 
12:17; 2 Kings 15:5) and the nominal form negaʿ, 
used to describe illnesses, especially the skin disease 
ṣaraʿat.49 Second, like the Mesopotamian sources, the 
Bible refers to mass a&ictions as manifestations of the 
“hand” of God.50 It is important to stress that these 
semantic parallels, as opposed to etymological ones, 
do not imply inter-cultural contact or influence, but 
rather the independent emergence of similar concep-
tions in both cultures.
A similar blurring of boundaries between divine 
punishment and pathological conditions is reflected in 
David’s curse of Joab for the unjustified killing of Avner:
When David heard afterwards, he said, “I and 
my kingdom will be forever clean before the 
LORD of the blood of Avner the son of Ner. 
May it fall on the head of Joab and all of his kins-
man. May there never cease to be in the house of 
Joab a gonorrheic, leper, a holder of the spindle, 
a victim of the sword or a person lacking bread 
(2 Samuel 3:28–29).
Among the other unenviable conditions mentioned in 
this passage, this curse refers to the gonorrheic and the 
leper,51 who are among the most severe impurity bear-
48 See CAD M/I 194; S. M. Maul, “Die ‘Lösung vom Bann’: 
Überlegungen zu altorientalischen Konzeptionen von Krankheit 
und Heilkunst,” in Magic and Rationality, ed. Horstmano! and 
Stol, 79–95.
49 This parallel is noted by J. Milgrom (Leviticus 1–16, 776), 
though his interpretation that this term implies either a demonic 
attack or “contact with the pagan sphere” (following K. Elliger, 
Leviticus, HAT (Tübingen, 1966], 180) is unwarranted and con-
tradicts his subsequent statement: “In the Bible, God is always the 
author of negaʿ.” In P and D, this term is used exclusively in refer-
ence to “leprosy.”
50 E.g., Exod. 9:3; 1 Sam. 5:6, 9; 2 Sam. 24:14–15. A compa-
rable idiom (yd ʾilm) is also attested in Ugaritic texts (e.g., CAT 
2.10 11–13).
51 “Leprosy” is the conventional translations for the biblical 
term ṣaraʿat, which seems to conflate several di!erent types of skin 
diseases (see Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 816–20).
ers commanded to bring a sin-o!ering in Leviticus 
13–15 (see below). This source explicitly depicts these 
conditions as divine punishments.52 If we compare the 
contagious nature of divine punishment as manifested 
in the Mesopotamian sources cited above, especially 
the “curses” described in the Šurpu incantations, we 
may suspect that the stipulations pertaining to the 
transfer of “pollution” (ṭumʾah) in Leviticus 13–15 
may be rooted in a concern that such pathological 
conditions may be contagious.
Reassessing the Biblical Evidence: 
Between Infection and Pollution
The previous sections have provided the theoretical 
and historical background for an embodied account 
of the biblical concept of pollution, particularly as it 
relates to infection. The first example to be discussed is 
Leviticus 15, which deals specifically with gonorrheics 
(zab; vv. 3–15),53 seminal emissions (16–18), men-
struants (19–24), and female gonorrheics (25–30). 
Aside from stipulating the periods of separation and 
rites of purification necessary in the di!erent cases, the 
chapter describes the manner by which pollution was 
spread, thereby revealing the ontological assumptions 
underlying the ritual prescriptions.
Throughout this chapter, one finds a repeated dis-
tinction between a severe degree of defilement re-
quiring bathing and laundering and a lesser degree of 
defilement requiring only bathing. The following are 
cases of the severe form. Those pertaining to gonor-
rheics included: one who touched the gonorrheic’s 
bedding (v. 5); one who sat in the gonorrheic’s seat 
(6); one who touched his “flesh” (7, see discussion 
below); a person spat upon by the gonorrheic (8); one 
who lifted the gonorrheic’s riding seat and other seat-
ing implements(?) (10b); and whoever the gonorrheic 
touched with unwashed hands (11). Regarding defile-
ment by semen, laundering is required for any fabric 
or leather with semen on it (17). Severe defilement 
52 See S. M. Olyan, Disability in the Hebrew Bible: Interpret-
ing Mental and Physical Di)erences (Cambridge, 2008), 54–56; 
Y. Feder, Blood Expiation in Hittite and Biblical Ritual: Origins, 
Context and Meaning (Atlanta, 2011), 107–108.
53 The identification of the biblical condition with gonorrhea is 
only provisional. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, against some 
claims to the contrary (e.g., Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 907), there is 
no reason to deny the awareness of venereal diseases in the ancient 
Near East. See now Scurlock and Andersen, Diagnoses in Assyrian 
and Babylonian Medicine, 88–97.
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by menstruants was transferred to one who touched 
their bedding or seats (21–22), and so too regarding 
the bedding or seats of female gonorrheics (26–27).
Although many exegetes assume that the person 
experiencing the discharge would bear the most severe 
degree of impurity,54 this assumption was at odds with 
the text. Throughout this chapter, we observe that 
people who su!ered from prolonged genital emissions 
conveyed a degree of defilement by means of their 
sitting and laying on implements which was equiv-
alent to or more severe than the defilement caused 
by touching the defiling person himself (see below). 
Clearly, the rationale for these laws was the entirely 
concrete concern that the emission would drip on the 
furnishings, so that the unsuspecting person who sat 
or lay on them might accidently touch the emission 
itself. In this regard, defilement operated as a “judg-
ment heuristic,”55 whereby the mere possibility that 
an emission may have dripped on the object became 
a foregone conclusion, at least from the standpoint of 
preventing the further transfer of defilement. It is thus 
comparable to the repulsion from putting shoes on 
the kitchen table due to the fear that perhaps the per-
son stepped in something objectionable. According 
to the logic of the heuristic, this possibility demands 
a behavioral response which takes it as a certainty.56 A 
similar heuristic is well-attested in ethnographic data, 
as reflected by the common fear of a menstruant step-
ping over one’s food.57
So far, so good. We will now proceed to see how 
some purported di"culties in the text can be over-
come by following this same logic. In particular, com-
mentators have pointed out the discrepancy between 
the rule that touching the bedding or seat of  female 
menstruants or gonorrheics required laundering 
(vv. 21–22; 26–27) and the rule that contact with the 
discharger herself demanded only bathing (19, cf. 25). 
54 This assumption is fundamental to the rabbinic understanding 
of these laws, as well as that of D. Wright and J. Milgrom among 
modern commentators (see below).
55 For a treatment of contagion as a heuristic (an emotionally-
biased rule of thumb), see Rozin and Nemero!, “Sympathetic 
Magical Thinking,” 201–16.
56 The Samaritan halakha recognizes that the danger of direct 
contact with the defiling fluids is central to understanding purity 
laws and elaborates on this point in some detail. See I. R. Bóid, 
Principles of Samaritan Halachah (Leiden, 1989), 141, 148, 150–
51, 154; T. Kazen, “Explaining Discrepancies in the Purity Laws on 
Discharges,” RB (2007): 362.
57 See e.g., A. S. Meigs, Food, Sex, and Pollution: A New Guinea 
Religion (New Brunswick, 1984), 102–103.
Some commentators apply a fortiori logic to resolve 
the tension: if these implements, defiled by secondary 
contact, required laundering, then so much more so 
the discharger herself, the source of the  impurity.58 
Though this argument is perfectly logical, it miscon-
strues the rationale of the contagion schema by which 
the possibility of touching the discharge itself was of 
greater concern than touching the person.
But we must also consider the seemingly anoma-
lous case of touching the “flesh” of the gonorrheic 
(7), which did require laundering and washing: “The 
one who touches the flesh (basar) of a gonorrheic 
will launder his clothes, wash and be impure until the 
evening.” Here the problem surrounds the polyva-
lent term basar which was used in two distinct senses 
within the chapter: in the sense of “body” (vv. 13, 16) 
and as a euphemism for the male (vv. 2–3, 3x) and 
female (19) genitalia. Most commentators read the 
verse in the former sense such that any contact with 
the gonorrheic’s body required laundering.59 Once 
again, some employ a fortiori logic: if touching the 
menstruant’s body defiled (19), did it not stand to 
reason that touching the more severe gonorrheic also 
defiled?60
However logical this argument may have been, it 
is di"cult to reconcile with the language of v. 7. First, 
we should note that basar in the sense “body” appears 
only in the context of washing, whereas the euphe-
mistic sense appears in the context of defiling contact, 
as in the present verse. Second, all of the other cases 
which required laundering involved situations which 
put the person at risk of touching the emission itself. 
The only exception was the spit of the gonorrheic 
(8), which was still a form of direct contact with the 
impurity bearer’s bodily fluid. Indeed, as noted above, 
58 So already the Rabbis: Sifra, Zabim, Par. 4:9 (ed. I. M. Weiss, 
Sipra with Rabad’s Commentary [New York, 1946], 76a); m. Zabim 
5:6. See also D. P. Wright, The Disposal of Impurity: Elimination 
Rites in the Bible and in Hittite and Mesopotamian Literature 
 (Atlanta, 1987), 189.
59 Ibn Ezra; G. J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, NICOT 
(Grand Rapids, MI, 1979), 219; Wright, Disposal of Impurity, 183; 
 Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 914; Kazen, “Purity Laws on Discharges,” 
358.
60 Wright, Disposal of Impurity, 181, 183, n. 34. Milgrom attri-
butes a similar deduction to the Rabbis, but I was unable to find the 
midrash cited (Leviticus 1–16, 914). In any case, this understanding 
leads Milgrom to prefer the reading הב in v. 27 (along with 2 MSS 
and LXX) against the MT and other versions (943). However, since 
the structure of vv. 26–27 follows that of 21–22, MT should be 
retained.
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contact with the menstruant only required bathing 
(19b), a comparison which supports understanding 
basar in the more stringent law of v. 7 as referring to 
the gonorrheic’s genitalia.61
Moreover, this interpretation is necessary to ac-
count for the stipulation in v. 11 that anyone whom 
the gonorrheic touched without washing his hands 
would have to launder and bathe. According to the 
understanding of v. 7 that any contact with the gon-
orrheic’s body required laundering, one faces the dif-
ficulty to explain why the text specifically refers to his 
unwashed hands. However, the localized defilement 
of this verse is quite understandable if we assume that 
the concern was that his discharge may have defiled 
his hands.62 Since men touch their genitals when uri-
nating, we can understand why this stipulation is not 
mentioned regarding female dischargers.63
As a result, we must understand v. 7 as referring 
to direct contact with the genitals of the gonorrheic. 
Though one may be initially surprised that the law 
would deal with such a possibility, it should be pointed 
out that the chapter deals elsewhere with defilement 
through sexual relations (18), including those with 
a menstruant (24).64 Unlike the (minor) defilement 
caused by ejaculation, which takes place only in the 
course of the sexual act, the discharge of the gonor-
rheic is continuous. Thus, even aside from sexual rela-
tions, contact with the gonorrheic’s penis demanded 
laundering.
This line of interpretation allows us to o!er a more 
precise explanation for the requirement of laundering. 
This requirement is often taken to be a merely formal 
indication of the distinction between severe and less 
severe forms of defilement.65 However, in light of the 
fact that the situations which demanded laundering 
involved potential contact with the emission itself, it 
would appear that the underlying concern was that 
the discharge may also have gotten on the person’s 
61 A. Ehrlich, Randglossen zur hebräischen Bibel, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 
1909), 52; Elliger, Leviticus, 191, 197.
62 So the Samaritan “Book of Insight” (Boid, Principles, 145, 
219).
63 Wright, Disposal of Impurity, 183, n. 35; Kazen, “Purity Laws 
on Discharges,” 363.
64 This is the most severe case mentioned in the chapter, trans-
ferring a week-long state of impurity equivalent to that of the men-
struant herself.
65 E.g., Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 913: “Touching the bedding 
of the zāb requires laundering because of the intensity of the im-
purity.”
clothing.66 Thus, this rule was essentially an extension 
of the same heuristic which construed the possibility 
of a “stain” as a foregone conclusion.
A similar dynamic is implied by the biblical depic-
tion of corpse impurity. In particular, Numbers 19:14–
15 states that a corpse defiles objects found together 
with it in an enclosure (ʾohel, literally a “tent”): “This 
is the instruction: In the event a person dies inside a 
tent, anyone who enters the tent and anyone inside 
the tent shall be impure for seven days. Any open 
vessel that does not have a lid fastened around it is 
impure.” The underlying conception seems to have 
been that this defilement would spread like a gas.67 
As B. A. Levine points out, this mode of pollution is 
particularly clear from the law of the open vessel in 
v. 15: “The operative principle is that the impurity 
present within the structure invades all of its interior 
air, or space, and only sealed vessels are protected.”68 
This conceptualization seems to have shaped, at least 
in part, the rabbinic elaboration of these laws. The 
conceptualization of corpse impurity as a gas is evi-
dent in various principles, including the assumption 
that corpse impurity spread in all directions inside a 
tent and the notion that it tended to escape through 
openings, that “it is the nature of impurity to exit 
and not to enter.”69 Why did corpse impurity spread 
like a gas within an enclosure, unlike the forms of 
defilement described in Leviticus 15, which required 
contact? The answer is simple: the spread of this form 
of defilement was modeled after the dissemination of 
the stench of a decomposing corpse.
A similar correlation between phenomenal experi-
ence (odor) and the conceptualization of death pollu-
tion is found in other cultures. For instance, classical 
sources from ancient Greece and Rome attest to the 
belief that the house in which a corpse was found 
 required purification and should be marked with a pine 
66 However, intensity of contact may perhaps explain other cases 
of laundering which are not related to genital discharges (e.g., Lev. 
11:39–40; 14:46–7). See Wright, Disposal of Impurity, 185–86, 
n. 39.
67 So J. Neusner, The Mishnaic System of Uncleanness: Its Context 
and History (vol. 22 of A History of the Mishnaic Law of Impurities; 
Leiden, 1977), 72.
68 B. A. Levine, Numbers 1–20, AB (New York, 1993), 467.
69 For a discussion of “realistic” aspects of the tannaitic charac-
terization of corpse impurity, see V. Noam, “Ritual Impurity in Tan-
naitic Literature: Two Opposing Perspectives,” Journal of Ancient 
Judaism 1 (2010): 81–86.
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or cypress branch on its entrance to warn outsiders.70 
Unfortunately, these references tend to be anecdotal, 
precluding further analysis. Modern ethnographic evi-
dence, however, provides striking parallels which bear 
directly on the biblical case. Note, for example, the 
custom of Indonesians to scrupulously seal all of the 
cracks in a co"n from the concern that death will 
be spread with the odors. Herz writes: “The reason 
[Indonesians] consider it so highly desirable that the 
putrefaction should take place in a sealed container 
is that the evil power which resides in the corpse and 
which is linked to the smells must not be allowed to 
escape and strike the living.”71 A comparable view is 
attested among the Cantonese who fear the “killing 
airs” (sat hei) emitted by the corpse, which are thought 
to permeate the house of the deceased. Watson cites 
a local informant who describes the danger that the 
killing airs—associated with the departing spirit of the 
deceased—will cling to mourners “like an invisible 
cloud.”72 These parallels reflect a similar conceptual-
ization of the power of death to spread in a manner 
corresponding to sense experience.
A final example is that of the “leper” described in 
Leviticus 13–14. Leaving aside the vexed question of 
the medical identification of this disease, the ostraciza-
tion of the leper is strongly reminiscent of measures 
taken to avoid the spread of infection:
The leper who has the a&iction: his clothes 
shall be torn, his hair shall be disheveled, he 
shall cover his moustache and call out: ‘Impure, 
impure!’ He shall be impure for all of the days 
that the a&iction is upon him. He is impure. He 
shall dwell alone. His dwelling shall be outside 
the camp (Leviticus 13:45–46).
70 See Parker, Miasma, 35, 38; E. Marshall, “Death and Disease 
in Cyrene,” 10; H. Lindsay, “Death-Pollution and Funerals in the 
City of Rome,” in Death and Disease, ed. Hope and Marshall, 155, 
166, 169.
71 R. Herz, Death and the Right Hand, trans. R. and C. Need-
ham (Aberdeen, 1960 [1907–1909]), 32.
72 See J. L. Watson, “Of Flesh and Bones: The Management of 
Death Pollution in Cantonese Society,” in Death and the Regenera-
tion of Life, ed. M. Bloch and J. Parry (Cambridge, 1982), 155–86, 
esp. 158. It is interesting to note that the reentry of mourners 
into society is marked on the seventh day by a ceremony known as 
“putting on the red” (ch’uan hung), in which mourners exchange 
their white mourning garb with red, associated with life and luck 
(p. 165). The color symbolism here o!ers a suggestive parallel to 
the red heifer rite of Numbers 19, though we must keep in mind 
that color symbolism in general is much more pervasive and explicit 
in Cantonese culture than in ancient Israel.
Despite the fact that the text makes no allusion to the 
possibility of infection, the requirement that the leper 
warn others of his condition and his isolation from the 
camp suggests a fear of contagion. The banishment 
of the leper is mentioned several times in the Hebrew 
Bible (e.g., Numbers 5:2–5; 12:14; 2 Kings 7:3–10), 
including non-Priestly texts, and this would seem to 
reflect actual practice. Moreover, the requirement to 
cover the mustache (or upper lip) of the leper has been 
explained as reflecting the fear that he would spread 
his condition through his breath.73 This interpreta-
tion finds support among interpreters of the Second 
Temple Period who warned against being downwind 
of the leper, which correlates suggestively with the fact 
that actual leprosy (Hansen’s disease) is contracted via 
the respiratory system.74
Moreover, the purifying leper was to perform an 
elimination rite in which the pollution was transferred 
to a bird and sent o! into the open country. Although 
this rite took place after he had already healed (Le-
viticus 14:3), it is highly reminiscent of scapegoat rites 
carried out in cases of plague.75 Finally, even after the 
first stage of purification was performed and the pu-
rifying leper was permitted to re-enter the camp, he 
was still required to dwell outside his tent (14:8). This 
latter requirement has been understood, already by 
its early interpreters in the Second Temple Period, as 
implying that he would defile all that was inside an 
enclosure with him.76
It is significant that the leper and the gonorrheic 
were required to bring expiatory o!erings, which was 
not the case with normal bodily discharges. The leper 
was required to bring a sin o!ering together with a 
burnt o!ering (Leviticus 14:19, 31), and the blood 
of a guilt o!ering was daubed on his right ear, thumb 
73 Ibn Ezra on v. 45; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 805–806. In fact, 
the Temple Scroll (46:16–18) and the Rabbis (Leviticus Rabbah 
16:3) show concern for being downwind from the “leper.” See also 
Y. Feder, “The Polemic Regarding Skin Disease in 4QMMT,” DSD 
19 (2012): 69.
74 The validity of this point depends on the assumption that 
ṣaraʿat (in biblical and later usage) included Hansen’s disease 
among other conditions. For discussion, see Feder, “Polemic 
 Regarding Skin Disease,” 68–70.
75 See K. Aartun, “Studien zum Gesetz über den grossen 
Versöhnungstag Lv 16 mit Varianten. Ein ritualgeschichtlicher 
Beitrag,” Studia Theologica 34 (1980): 84–86; Wright, Disposal of 
Impurity, 45–57; 65–69.
76 See J. Melkman, “Leprosy,” EJ 11:36; Milgrom, Leviticus 
1–16, 843; Maccoby, Ritual and Morality, 141–8; Feder, “Polemic 
Regarding Skin Disease,” 60, 63.
Contagion and Cognition ) 163
and big toe (12–14, 21–25). Similarly, both male and 
female gonorrheics were required to bring sin o!er-
ings (Leviticus 15:15, 30). The need for expiatory of-
ferings in these cases was consistent with David’s curse 
which explicitly referred to leprosy and gonorrhea as 
divine punishments (2 Samuel 3:29).
However, the peculiar fact is that Priestly sources 
tended to draw a clear distinction between disease and 
sin. For example, unlike non-Priestly sources which 
frequently depicted leprosy as a punishment (e.g., 
Numbers 12; 2 Kings 5:26–27; 2 Chronicles 26:16–
21), P makes no inference of this sort.77 Moreover, the 
rationales given in the sin o!ering instructions clearly 
distinguish between o!erings brought on account of 
transgressions (Leviticus 4; 16; Numbers 15: 22–31) 
and those brought on account of impurities (Leviticus 
12; 14–15). Whereas the sin o!ering in the former 
cases served to expiate sin and gain forgiveness, in 
the latter cases it merely removed defilement.78 This 
distinction would seem to di!erentiate P’s perspec-
tive from the conflation of sin and disease implied by 
David’s curse. On this background, the requirement 
that the leper and gonorrheic bring expiatory o!erings 
(Leviticus 14–15) is best understood as reflecting the 
conservatism of cult practice.
Aside from distinguishing between pollution and 
sin, Priestly materials also seem to distinguish pollu-
tion from infection. It is striking that the priests play 
no role in healing the leper; the text limits their func-
tion to his purification after the condition has healed 
on its own (Leviticus 14:3).79 This tendency is par-
ticularly striking in H’s redaction of the purity rules, 
which emphasized the fear of defiling the sanctuary, 
and implicitly rejected any inherent danger associated 
with these conditions. Indeed, the exhortation con-
cluding Leviticus 15:31 warns: “You shall set apart the 
Israelites from their impurities lest they die in their 
impurities by defiling my Tabernacle that is among 
77 J. S. Baden and C. R. Moss, “The Origins and Interpretation 
of ṣāraʿat in Leviticus 13–14,” Journal of Biblical Literature 130 
(2011): 643–53.
78 See R. Gane, Cult and Character. Purification O)erings, Day 
of Atonement, and Theodicy (Winona Lake, IN, 2005), 112–24.
79 See Y. Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, trans. M. Greenberg 
(Chicago, 1960), 107–108; Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 887–89; 
cf. B. A. Levine, In the Presence of the Lord (Leiden, 1974), 83–85. 
Interestingly, a similar tendency is also attested outside the Priestly 
materials, particularly in the story of Naaman’s leprosy (2 Kgs. 5), 
in which the contraction of the disease by Gehazi is portrayed as a 
consequence of his disobedience to Elisha and not as an immediate 
result of contagion.
them.”80 Likewise, another H passage bans severe 
impurity bearers due to the threat of contaminating 
the sacred camp (Numbers 5:1–3):81
1 The LORD spoke to Moses, saying: 2 “Com–
mand the Israelites to remove from the camp 
anyone with leprosy or a discharge and anyone 
defiled by a corpse.3 Remove male and female 
alike; put them outside the camp so that they 
will not defile the camp where I reside in their 
midst.
Strikingly, this verse specifies the three types of 
pollution that are based on models of infection: the 
leper, the gonorrheic and corpse impurity. Through 
the explicit reference to the divine presence in the midst 
of the camp, this verse effectively restricts these types 
of defilement to the sacral domain.82 Similar warnings 
appear in relation to corpse impurity (Numbers 19:13, 
20).83 In these statements, failure to purify is depicted 
as defiling God’s sanctuary, revealing a consistent ten-
dency of H to restrict the threat of pollution to the 
sacred domain.
In summary, the Priestly depiction of these condi-
tions presents us with a paradox. On one hand, the 
characterization of the spread of pollution as well as 
the isolation and expiatory o!erings required of the 
impurity bearer hint at an underlying concern with 
80 On the ascription of this verse to H, see Milgrom, Leviticus 
1–16, 946–47; I. Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah 
and the Holiness School (Winona Lake, IN, 2007), 69–70. As these 
authors note, the first person possessive form ינכשמ is a tell-tale 
indicator of H’s authorship.
81 As other commentators have pointed out, it is necessary here 
to distinguish H from P, as Lev. 15 does not imply the banishment 
of the gonorrheic from the camp. See Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 920. 
A similar distinction can also be made regarding corpse impurity 
through comparison with Num. 19 (ibid., 276–77).
82 This straight-forward reading of the passage has been ob-
scured by interpreters, ancient and modern, who interpret םהינחמ 
as referring to “their camps” (plural) and thus assert the existence 
of a requirement to maintain purity in all cities. For a coherent un-
derstanding of the syntax and content of this passage, it is necessary 
to understand the form as singular (“their camp”). Note the form 
ךינחמ alongside ךנחמ in Deut. 23:15, both meaning “your camp” 
(singular). Among the moderns, the fact that םהינחמ in our verse 
is singular has been noted by J. Licht (A Commentary on the Book 
of Numbers, vol. 1 [Jerusalem, 1985], 59–60 [Heb.]), and Levine 
(Numbers 1–20, 182, 186), and it is assumed by the JPS translation. 
I plan on elaborating on these points in a study in progress, “The 
Wilderness Camp Paradigm in the Holiness Source and the Temple 
Scroll: From Purity Laws to Cult Politics.”
83 For the ascription of vv. 13, 20 to H, see Knohl, Sanctuary 
of Silence, 92–94.
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the spread of infection or curse. On the other hand, 
the biblical materials display an e!ort to de-emphasize 
or even deny the danger of infection. Despite these 
e!orts to recontextualize pollution as posing a threat 
only in relation to the sacred domain, the behaviors 
associated with these forms of impurity indicate that 
these conditions were not always perceived to be 
innocuous.
Pollution as Conceptual Scheme: 
Its Psychological Foundations
Although the notion of an unseen force exhibiting 
physical properties may seem obscure initially, its in-
ner logic can be revealed by reference to the cognitive 
linguistic notion of “conceptual integration.” Unlike 
work on “conceptual metaphor” (e.g., “an argument 
is a war”) that assumes a unidirectional mapping from 
a concrete source domain to a more abstract target 
domain,84 research on conceptual integration focuses 
on how two distinct domains can merge or blend. One 
type of conceptual integration which is particularly 
relevant to our discussion is that of experiential cor-
relation, as elucidated through the theory of “primary 
metaphors.” According to this theory, the inherent 
correlation between two or more units of experience 
(sub-scenes) in a recurrent primary scene can serve 
as the basis for primary metaphors.85 For example, 
a statement such as “You saw the logic of my argu-
ment” can be taken as based on a metaphor: “seeing 
is understanding.” In this case, the primary metaphor 
“seeing is understanding” originates in the fact that 
the state of understanding (a cognitive sub-scene) 
often correlates with visual recognition (a perceptive 
sub-scene). In such situations, to visually detect X is 
tantamount to becoming aware of X.
This analytic framework can be adapted to elucidate 
the biblical notion of blood-guilt, which is depicted 
84 For a brief introduction to this theory and its application to 
biblical studies, see J. Jindo, “Toward a Poetics of the Biblical Mind: 
Language, Culture and Cognition”, VT 59 (2009): 222–43.
85 See J. Grady and C. Johnson, “Converging Evidence for the 
Notions of Subscene and Primary Scene,”  in Metaphor and Meton-
ymy in Comparison and Contrast, ed. R. Dirven and R. Pörings 
(Berlin, 2003), 533–55. For “primary metaphors” as a source of 
conceptual integration, see J. Grady, “Primary Metaphors as In-
puts to Conceptual Integration,” Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005): 
1595–1614. Many of the examples, including those below, could 
also potentially be described as metonymy-based metaphor, specifi-
cally the “e!ect for cause” metonymy (but cf. Grady and Johnson, 
“Converging Evidence,” 540).
in numerous passages as a source of pollution (e.g., 
Numbers 35:33–34; Deuteronomy 21:1–9). The 
biblical corpus gives abundant expression to the view 
that the spilling of innocent blood results in a stain 
that would provoke a divine punishment on the entire 
community unless proper action was taken against the 
murderer. While some sources depict a personified 
conception in which the blood of the victim remains 
in a state of distress as long as the perpetrator goes 
unpunished (Genesis 4:11; Job 16:18),86 most sources 
depict retribution as an automatic mechanical process 
in which references to “blood” (damim) denote an 
invisible taint which threatens to invite punishment 
until the blood-debt is paid o!.87 The important point 
for our purposes is that the guilt was conceptualized 
as a blood-stain, which could stain the perpetrator’s 
body and pollute the land. This synthesis can be rep-
resented as follows:
Though one might be tempted to say that the blood 
symbolizes (i.e., represents) the culpability, this for-
mulation distorts the fact that we are dealing with a 
single concept. In this case, the blood spilled is merely 
the perceptible aspect of a deed which has unseen, yet 
nevertheless inevitable, ramifications.
This phenomenon of conceptual integration is also 
manifested in the characterization of sexual misdeeds 
(especially incest) as polluting.88 As in the case of 
bloodshed, the guilt entailed by illicit sexual inter-
course is depicted as defiling, a taint that can cause 
the land to vomit out its inhabitants (Leviticus 18: 
26–28). The exceptional nature of these two catego-
ries of moral transgression—murder and sexual mis-
conduct—has already been pointed out by Ricoeur 
in a cross-cultural generalization: “The comparison 
86 See also Isa. 26:21; Ezek. 24:7–8. This scheme should prob-
ably be related to the belief that the blood contains a person’s ani-
mating spirit (e.g., Gen. 9:4; Deut. 12:23).
87 E.g., Deut. 21:1–9; 2 Sam. 3:28; 21:1–6; 1 Kgs. 2:33. See 
Y. Feder, “The Mechanics of Retribution,” 138–49, and Blood Ex-
piation, 173–89.
88 E.g., Gen. 34:5, 13, 27; Lev. 18; Num. 5:12–31. See Frymer-
Kensky, “Pollution, Purification and Purgation,” 408.
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between sexuality and murder is supported by the 
same play of images: in both cases, impurity is con-
nected with the presence of a material ‘something’ 
that transmits itself by contact and contagion.”92899091
Similarly, we can depict the Israelite conception 
of pollution as it applies to genital disorders (Le-
viticus 15) as follows:92
A similar model could be used for corpse impurity 
(Numbers 19), but in this case, the correlation would 
be between the odor of the corpse and the perceived 
spread of misfortune.
We can now integrate these insights in identifying 
a set of base images of ṭumʾah in the Hebrew Bible. 
These separate models involve a clear correspondence 
between an experiential image and the emotional re-
sponse and normative cultural implications involved 
with it. Though these models should not be taken 
rigidly (see my caveats below), they seem to reflect 
fundamental distinctions between di!erent types of 
pollution (see table 1).
Forms of ṭumʾah which fit the broad characteriza-
tion of being “unclean” are the least severe, requiring 
only that the person or object be distanced from the 
89 “Disgust” as used here may vary from a mild sense of dirtiness 
following contact with semen to a more intense repulsion, e.g., as a 
reaction to menstrual blood.
90 Cf. Kazen’s reference to “sense of justice” (“Impurity, Ritual 
and Emotion”).
91 Regarding the sin o!ering of the parturient, see Feder, Blood 
Expiation, 141–42.
92 Ricouer, Symbolism of Evil, 28.
sacred realm. The governing factor here is the need 
to be pure when approaching God.93 This basic atti-
tude towards approaching the divine realm is probably 
universal and finds vivid expression in the Mesopo-
tamian concern not to approach the gods with even 
bad breath.94
The “infection” model has been discussed above 
at length. It pertains to a select group of conditions 
which were associated with a fear of contagion. This 
fear element can account for the more complex pu-
rificatory process and the need for sacrificial o!erings. 
As noted above, the manner of infection is modeled 
after the concrete expression of this defilement (e.g., 
genital emission, odor).
The “stain of transgression” pertains to violations 
of cultural norms, specifically those of murder and 
sexual misconduct. Since these are analogous to the 
sources of infection in that they involve a release of 
bodily fluids (stains) and a fear of imminent danger 
(threats of punishment), the stain of transgression 
might be viewed as derivative of the cleanliness and 
infection models, which are more directly grounded in 
bodily experience. Unlike the other models, however, 
these forms of pollution are described as defiling the 
land, and they cannot be rectified by ritual cleansing 
or even sacrifice. These stains invariably lead to retri-
bution: murder demands compensation for the blood 
spilled (expiation), and the perpetrators of sexual mis-
deeds will need to su!er divine punishment, such as 
the extirpation of one’s lineage (karet).95
93 See Lev. 12:4. This consideration is at work also in the law 
of the war camp in Deut. 23:10–15. Alongside the demand to ex-
clude soldiers who experienced a seminal emission, the soldiers are 
required to relieve themselves outside the camp, so as not to o!end 
the divine presence in their midst.
94 See van der Toorn, Sin and Sanction, 21–36.
95 Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, Purification and Purgation,” 
406–409. To an extent, the distinction between bodily sources 
of pollution and the “stain of transgression” model resembles the 
distinction between “ritual” and “moral” impurity advocated by 
some scholars; see A. Büchler, Studies In Sin and Atonement in the 
Table 1
Experiential Image Uncleanness Infection Stain of transgression
Core Emotion Disgust89 Fear Outrage90
Examples Normal genital discharges Abnormal genital discharges, 
corpse impurity, leprosy
Blood-guilt
Sexual immorality
Normative implications/ 
concerns
Separation from sacred Spread of misfortune Defilement of person/land, 
divine retribution
Methods of purification Passage of time, washing91 Banishment, passage of time, 
washing and sacrifice
Expiatory act (if possible), 
punishment
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As in the models analyzed by Nemero! and Rozin, 
the distinct characteristics of each image, and particu-
larly the distinct means of purification for each, sup-
ports the assumption that they were taken as separate 
models, despite the fact that they were incorporated 
into a common category: ṭumʾah. Although the re-
lationship between these images and their role in the 
semantic development of ṭumʾah requires further 
study, it is possible, at least, to suggest a provisional 
assessment. I am inclined to view both the unclean-
ness and infection images as primary (i.e., not derived 
from one another), and subsequently merged under a 
single term.96 This convergence can be explained on 
the basis of the observation that contamination sensi-
tivity is “elicitor neutral,” as explained by Daniel Kelly: 
“Any elicitor of disgust, regardless of the actual nature 
of the elicitor or which ‘domain’ of disgust it falls in 
(physical, social, moral), has contamination potency 
of the same basic sort.”97 That is to say, the notion of 
contagion was su"ciently generic to warrant the us-
age of a common term to describe both uncleanness 
and infection.98 However, as noted above, the stain-
of-transgression image should probably be viewed as 
a secondary development, modeled after aspects of 
uncleanness and infection. 99
It should be stressed, however, that the biblical 
treatment of pollution in all of its heterogeneity cap-
tures a richness of embodied experience which can-
not be adequately represented in a schematic chart. 
Rabbinic Literature of the First Century (New York, 1967), 212–
69; J. Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism (New York, 
2000), 21–42. However, the schemas of pollution described here 
are closer to the Israelite conceptualization than the etic categories 
employed in modern scholarship.
96 Interestingly, Kelly has advanced the “Entanglement Thesis,” 
arguing that human notions of disgust are comprised of two evo-
lutionarily distinct responses, the “a!ect program” which reacts to 
ingesting potentially toxic substances and “core disgust” which is 
an adaptive response to disease and parasites (Yuck! The Nature 
and Moral Significance of Disgust [Cambridge, MA, 2011], 43–60). 
Whether or not this theory is correct, it o!ers a suggestive model 
for how two similar but distinct experiences could converge under 
a common terminology.
97 Ibid., 19; see also 33–34, 39.
98 Hence, “pollution” should be viewed as a “classifier,” a lin-
guistically constructed category which can refer to several distinct 
types of experience (see Violi, Meaning and Experience, 132).
99 The same would apply to the usage of pollution terminology 
to describe idolatry, which is further removed from bodily experi-
ence. For discussion of the latter, see Frymer-Kensky, “Pollution, 
Purification and Purgation,” 406; André, “אמט,” TDOT 5:330–31; 
Wright, “Unclean and Clean,” 734.
In particular, it is not possible to determine a prior-
ity between the experiential schema and the emotion 
evoked by it. As noted above, emotional response is an 
inherent part of the perception of contagion.100 Fur-
thermore, some sources of pollution do not conform 
so neatly to this analytic framework. In particular, 
though menstrual and puerperal blood are normal dis-
charges, they had implications even outside the sacral 
sphere, namely in the strict ban on sexual relations.101 
Since sex with a menstruant involves the violation 
of the acceptable norms of conduct, being listed to-
gether with abominable sexual acts such as bestiality 
and incest, and entails divine punishment (Leviticus 
18:19, 20:18), it fits the stain-of-transgression model 
in this regard. The severe ramifications entailed in the 
case of sex with a menstruant apparently stems from 
the extreme repulsion felt towards this behavior.102 
But rather than contradicting the existence of dis-
tinct types suggested above, this case should serve 
as a reminder that the various types of pollution are 
ultimately derived from attitudes towards the body in 
all of its multifarious possibilities—not from a rigid 
disembodied logic.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to elucidate the em-
bodied logic of pollution as depicted in the Hebrew 
100 This is a complex topic which requires further discussion. For 
the view that normative and a!ective content is built into concepts 
and schemas, see R. G. D’Andrade, “Schemas as Motivation,” in 
Human Motives and Cultural Models, ed. R. G. D’Andrade and 
C. Strauss (Cambridge, 1992), 23–44; R. A. Shweder, “Ghost-
busters in Anthropology,” ibid., 45–58; P. Violi, “Beyond the Body: 
Towards a Full Embodied Semiosis,” in Body, Language and Mind. 
Volume 2: Sociocultural Situatedness, ed. R. M. Frank et al. (Berlin, 
2008), 66–71.
101 For discussion of the “menstrual taboo” in Israel and cross-
culturally, see Eilberg-Schwartz, The Savage in Judaism; Malul, 
Knowledge, Control and Sex, 379–94; and more generally Meigs, 
Food, Sex, and Pollution; see also T. Buckley and A. Gottlieb, “A 
Critical Appraisal of Theories of Menstrual Symbolism,” in Blood 
Magic: The Anthropology of Menstruation, ed. T. Buckley and A. 
Gottlieb (Berkeley, 1988), 3–53.
102 A psychoanalytic interpretation suggests itself in light of the 
recognition that “disgust is antithetical to sexual desire” and that 
“disgust sensitivity is negatively correlated with the desire to en-
gage in a variety of sexual behaviors,” (D. M. T. Fessler and C. D. 
Navarrete, “Domain Specific Variation in Disgust Sensitivity Across 
the Menstrual Cycle,” Evolution and Human Behavior 24 [2003]: 
407), namely that the repulsion felt towards sex with the menstruant 
derives its intensity from the need to counteract sexual  attraction.
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Bible. Contrary to the dominant tendency to search 
for a unified abstract logic which underlies the purity 
laws, I have aimed to show that these rules were based 
on a series of distinct models of contagion, including 
uncleanness, infection and the stain of bloodshed and 
sexual misdeeds. These models were based on schemas 
of recurrent human experiences and involved a cor-
relation between a perceptible phenomenon (stain, 
odor, etc.) and an unseen essence  (pollution). In 
particular, I have focused on the laws of abnormal 
genital discharges in Leviticus 15, corpse impurity in 
Numbers 19, and leprosy in Leviticus 13–14, all of 
which were based in folk conceptions of infection. 
Through surveys of philological, ethnographic and 
historical evidence, I have shown that similar models 
are attested cross-culturally throughout the ancient 
and modern worlds.
This exploration into the concept of pollution 
has important implications for the study of ancient 
 Israelite thought. Earlier research has ascribed to the 
Israelites a “synthetic view of life” according to which 
they did not clearly distinguish between an action and 
its consequences.103 However, in light of recent stud-
ies focusing on the interdependency of mind, body, 
language and culture, we can o!er a more precise 
formulation of this phenomenon and its cognitive 
basis. On the one hand, it is clearly insu"cient to 
characterize the usage of “blood” (damim) as merely 
a case of  linguistic polysemy, whereby the term can 
refer to either the physical substance or blood-guilt. 
Usage of the linguistic term is expressive of a uni-
fied experiential image which involves both perceived 
and hidden aspects of blood, such that the linguistic 
103 See e.g., K. Koch, “Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im AT,” 
ZTK 52 (1955): 1–42, referring to the earlier work of K. Fahl-
gren; G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1, trans. D. M. G. 
Stalker (Louisville, 2001 [1962]), 265; cf. J. S. Kaminsky, Corporate 
 Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible (She"eld, 1995), 26–28.
concept serves as a reflection of the ontological as-
sumptions of the ancient Israelite. On the other hand, 
instead of relying on a vague appeal to a purported 
ancient Israelite mentality,104 we must consider the 
possibility that this ontological belief is an inevitable 
consequence of semiotic circumstances, in this case 
the need to conceptualize the abstract notion (culpa-
bility) by means of a concrete image (blood).105 These 
two aspects could only be decoupled through the de-
velopment of a linguistic terminology to distinguish 
them, though there was no reason to pursue such 
a terminology as long as they were perceived to be 
ontologically interrelated.
In comparison, the treatment of the concept of 
pollution indicates that it was ultimately distinguished 
from the notion of infection. In particular, H’s redac-
tion of the priestly instructions depicts these types of 
pollution as severe forms of uncleanness which were 
antithetical to the divine presence. If these genital dis-
charges, leprosy and corpse pollution had originally 
evoked a fear of infection, the threat associated with 
them was now limited to the sacred camp (Leviticus 
15:31; Numbers 5:3; 19:13, 20). Though the pro-
found ramifications of this reinterpretation of ṭumʾah 
are beyond the scope of this article, su"ce it to say 
that although the physiological danger associated with 
this concept had been neutralized, its powerful socio-
religious influence—as reflected in subsequent Jewish 
and Christian traditions—was only beginning to be 
manifested.
104 For further discussion of the problem of “mentalities,” see 
S. J. Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion and the Scope of Rationality 
(Cambridge, 1990), 84–104: B. Shore, Culture in Mind: Cognition, 
Culture and the Problem of Meaning (New York, 1996), 167–204.
105 For a di!erent view on the function of conceptual blending, 
cf. E. G. Slingerland, “Conceptual Blending, Somatic Marking and 
Normativity: A Case Example from Ancient Chinese,” Cognitive 
Linguistics 16 (2005): 557–84.

